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RECENT CASES
ADVERSE POSSESSioN-RAILROADS-PUBLC LANDS-EFFECT OF ABAN-
DONMENT.-MIN,LLS V. DENVER & R. G. R. Co., 198 FED., 137.-Held, where a
railroad company, which by the construction of its road has acquired a
right of way over public land, has abandoned the same by relocation of
its line and the removal of its track, the old right of way becomes subject
to the rules governing property privately owned, and title thereto may be
acquired by adverse possession under color of title.
As to whether a railroad right of way is the subject of adverse pos-
session there is a conflict among the authorities. Many cases have held
that title may be so acquired. Matthews v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co.,
110 Mich., -170; Pittsburg R. R. Co. v. Stickncy, 155 Ind., 312; Illinois
Central R. R. Co. v. Houghton, 126 Ill., 233. In other jurisdictions it is
held that a railroad right of way cannot be acquired by adverse possession
on the ground of the public natlwre of such a right ef way. Southern P. R. R.
Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal., 240; McLuCas v. St. Joseph R. R. Co., 67 Neb., 603.
In other jurisdictions a railroad right of way is put under the protection
of a statute. Littlefield v. Boston R. R. Co., 146 Mass., 268; Costello v.
Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 70 N. H., 403; St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Smith, 170
Mo., 327. The principal case does not deny the contention of the de-
fendant that a title acquired under an act of Congress cannot be taken
from it, but it draws a distinction, in that in the case under consideration
the right of way having been abandoned by the railroad company the
reason for the rule no longer exists. The company having taken up
another route, the old route loses its public nature and becomes subject to
the rules governing private property.
BILLS AND NOTES-E IENCE-PARTIES-PREUMPrTIONS-NATURE OF
LIABILITY.-VOODSVILLE GUARANTY SAVINGS BANK V. ROGERS ET AL., 83
ATL., 537 (VT.)-Held, that strangers to a note, who sign their names on
the back thereof, become prima facie makers, but may show that they are
indorsers and liable only as such.
Before the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law there was
considerable diversity of opinion as to the liability of a stranger who
signed his name on commercial paper. In some of the States such an
indorser was prima facie regarded as guarantor. Parkhuirst v. Vail, 73 IIl.,
343; Lyon & Co. v. Bank, 85 Fed., 120. In other jurisdictions he was
regarded as joint maker. Good v. Martin, 95 U. S., 90; Currier v. Fellows,
27 N. H., 366. The Massachusetts Courts adopted a stringent rule, hold-
ing such a party liable as maker, and did not admit parol evidence to
show that such was not his real contract. W1ay v. Butterworth. 108 Mass,
509. Still other jurisdictions regarded him as indorser. Moore v. Cross,
19 N. Y., 227; Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal., 485. But these Courts again dif-
RECENT CASES
fered as to whether he was first or second indorser; some holding him
prima facie second indorser. Coggszwell v. Hayden, 5 Ore., 22; Phelps v.
Vischer, 50 N. Y., 69. Others treated him as first indorser. Davis v.
Barron, 13 Wis., 227. In England such an indorser was not liable at all.
Steele v. McKinlcy, 5 App. Cas., 754; Gwinnell v. Herbert, 5 Adol. & E.,
436. The Negotiable Instruments Law has made important changes in
the States where it has been adopted. Section 17, subdivision 6, provides
that where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear
in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed
an indorser. Section 64 provides that where a person, not otherwise a
party to the instrument places thereon his signature in blank before de-
livery, he is held as indorser in accordance with the following rules:
(1) If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he is liable
to the payee and all subsequent parties. (2) If the instrument is payable to
the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to
all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer. (3) If he signs for the
accommodation of the payee he is liable to all parties subsequent to the
payee. Section 68 provides that as respects one another, indorsers are
liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse, but evidence is ad-
missible to show that as among themselves they have agreed otherwise.
Since the passage of the act there has been some conflict as to whether
parol evidence may be received to give the contract a different effect;
some Coorts helding that parol evidence is admissible: Haddock v. Had-
dock, 192 N. Y., 499; Bank v. Busby. 113 S. W. (Tenn.). 390; others
hold'ng it not. Bank v. Richel. 143 Ky.. 754; Ninineell v. [Veil. 95 T11 Air,,
15; Baneister z. Kuntz, 35 Fla., 340. It is the evident purpose of'the
statute to exclude parol evidence, and make the written contract control
the rights of the parties; therefore to allow parol evidence is reading into
the act a meaning not expressed by the words themselves. The act has
not been adopted in Vermont.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv-UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION-RAILROAD RATES.
-STATE EX REL. SIMPSON V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. Ry. Co., 137 N. W., 2
(MINN.).-Held, that an act establishing a lower rate than the maximum
passenger rate for the carriage of the members of the State's military force
upon railroad lines within the State, when such members are required to
so travel under orders in discharge of their military duties, is not an un-
lawful discrimination of which the defendant may complain; the defense
having been waived that such rate is not compensatory.
There is but one other case that discusses this question and that case
reaches a conclusion contrary to the one established in the principal case,
holding the act unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Re Gardner, 84 Kan., 264. But similar
statutes requiring a street car company to carry school children at half
the regular fare have been held valid. Coinm. v. Interstate Street R. R. Co.,
207 U. S., 79; Fitzmanrice v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 192 Mass., 159;
Sain Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgclt, 200 U. S., 304. A law requiring a
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railroad company carrying live stock for an individual, to carry him free
of charge was held to be unconstitutional. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v.
Campbell, 61 Kan., 439. Also laws requiring a railroad company to issue
mileage bocks at a lower rate than that regularly charged passenf,,rs have
been held void. Smith v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. Co., 173 U. S., 684;
Atty. Gen. v. Boston & A. R. R. Co., 160 Mass., 62. A State law estab-
lishing rates for transportation which will not admit of the carrier earning
such compensation as under all circumstances is just to it and the public
is unconstituional. Wallace v. Arkansas Cent. R. R. Co., 55 C. C. A., 192
The principal case disapproves of re Gardner, and distinguishes itself from
Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. 2,. Smith in that that case held the act unconsti-
tutional because of the uncertainty of the earnings of the company. this de-
fense having been waived in the principal case. The opinion points out that
requiring a lower rate for the transportation of the State's troops is not
discrimination against the company, because it receives all that it may
legaly demand; nor is it class discrimination, for the State pays the trans-
portation. The case is well argued and reaches a sane conclusion.
EASEMENTs-DISTINCTION IN CLASSES.-ADAMS V. HODGKINS, 84 ATL..
530 (ME.).-Held, that on an issue of abandonment of an easement for a
right of way across land, there is a distinction between an easement
created by deed and one acquired by prescription.
An easement acquired by actual deed or reservation is not lost by
non-user, but can only be lost by hostile and adverse possession for the
prescriptive period. Edgerton s,. ilM cMullen, 55 Kan., 90; Kamnerling v.
Grover, 9 Ind. App., 628. By statute in California, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Oklahoma, it is provided that an easement ac-
quired by prescription is extinguished by the disuser of the owner for the
period prescribed for acquiring the title. The cases of Browne v. Balti-
more M. E. Church, 37 Md., 108, and Shields v. Arndt, 4 N. J. Eq., 234
(dictum), arrive at the same conclusion under the theory that long non-
user affords a presumption of a release of the right. The distinction then
between the two kinds of easements lies in the methods of their abandon-
ment. This distinction is recognized to a limited extent in New York,
Maine and Massachusetts. The distinction, however, seems to be an im-
practical one as both easements arise out of a grant. Veghte v. Raritan
W'ater Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq., 142. The present trend of the Courts is,
in the absence of statutes, to entirely disregard the difference and to re-
quire actual adverse possession for the prescriptive period in order to ex-
tinguish any easement.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-SALE OF REAL ESTATE-WARRANTIES
-IEY v. VAUGHN ET AL., SINCLAIR V. SAME, SMITH V. SAME, 76 S. E., 464
(S. C.).-Held, that where a testator's will, though authorizing his exe-
cutors to sell his realty, did not authorize them to give a warranty, and
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the executors after advertising the sale as under the provisions of the will,
executed deeds containing a warranty as executors, they Were not per-
sonally liable; the warranty being without consideration, made in a repre-
sentative capacity, and not having injured the purchaser. Woods, J., dis-
senting.
A power of sale given by a will does not authorize an executor to bind
the estate by covenants of warranty. Ramsey v. Wandell, 32 Hun. (N. Y.),
482; Godley v. Taylor, 14 N. C., 178. If he makes such covenants they
operate as personal obligations. Jones v. Noe, 71 Ind., 368; Ross v. Barr,
21 Ky. L. Rep., 974; Lylich v. Baxter, 4 Tex., 431. Nor is the liability of
the executor on his covenants of warranty affected by the fact that the
purchaser had notice of the will under which the executor sold. Wurdentan
s. Robertson, Riley Eq. (S. C.), 115. This is true even though he describes
himself as covenanting as executor. Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn., 495. Bnt
should he covenant as executor, "but not otherwise", he does not bind
himself persontlly, even though it may not be binding on the estate of the
testator. Thayer v. Wendell, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13, 873. The principal case
is contrary to the authorities. However, in view of the fact that the war-
ranty was made in a represenetative capacity, "as exectitor", and the puf=
chaser has not been injured, it is certainly good sense, if not good law3 to
excuse the executor from personal liability.
JURY-EXAMINATIoN O1 JJURORS-VoIR DIR,-STATE V. HUFFMANN,
99 N. E., 295 (OHio).-Held, that upon a trial under an indictment for
bribery, it is not competent to inquire of a prospective juror upon his voir
dire whether he will stand upon his opinion of not guilty, formed upon
due delberation in the jury room, or will yi Id his op-nion mcr 'y f -r t .e
purpose of reaching a verdict in the case,
The purpose of the examination of a juror on voir dire is to deter-
mine whether or not he is qualified to sit in the trial, and a thorough
examination is allowed. Pinder v. State, 27 Fla., 370; Cont. v. Surles, 165
Mass., 59; Stools v. State, 108 Ind., 415. The questions asked should aim
to disclose the juror's relation to the parties and the actual disposition of
his mind as to the subject matter of the action. People v. Plyler, 126 Cal.,
379; Clark v. Com., 123 Pa. St., 555. Irrelevant or misleading questions
should be excluded by the Court. State v. Cleary, 97 Iowa, 413; State v.
Mills, 91 N. C., 581. The character of the questions and the nature and
extent of the inquiry is left to the judgment and judicial discretion of the
presiding judge. State v. Cross, 72 Conn., 722; Sullivan v. Padrosa, 122
Ga., 338; Donovan v. People, 139 Ill., 412. The exercise of the Court's
discretion wil not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly abused. Connors
z. United States, 158 U. S., 408; State qv. Brooks, 92 Mo., 542; Van Stike
v. Porter, 53 Neb., 28. In view of the fact that the questions asked of a
juror upon his voir dire are largely at the discretion of the presiding
judge, and review on appeal may be had only in rare cases, the pr;nc;pal
case must be considered contrary to the general trend of authority
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MARRIAGE-VALIDITY-COURTS OF DOiiICILE-JURISDICTION.-CUNNING-
HAM V. CUNNINGHAM, 99 N. E., 845 (N. Y.).-Held, where citizens of
New York went to another State and there contracted a marriage contrary
to the laws of New York, and returned immediately to their prior domi-
cile, the New York Courts had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marital status under the rule that the law of the place, not where the
contract was made, but where the parties have their domicile, governs.
Werner, J., dissenting.
In England the principle is well established that the validity of a mar-
riage must be determined by the law of the domicile of the parties and
not by the lex loci contractus. Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. Cas., 193; War-
render v. Warrender, 9 Bligh N. S., 89; Shaw s% Gould, L. R. 3 H. L., 55.
The weight of authority in America, however, is that the lex loci shall
control. Blaisdell v. Bickun, 139 Mass., 250; Travus v. Reinhardt, 205
U. S., 423; Canale v. People, 177 Ill., 219. This general rule is subject to
exceptions in case the marriage is repugnant to the laws of the domicile
in respect to incest, polygamy, or miscegenation. Com. v. Lane, 113 Mass.,
458; Hutchins v. Kininell, 31 Mich., 126. Another exception to the gen-
eral rule is made when the mariage is performed in another State in
evasion of the laws of the domicile upon the ground that it would be con-
trary to the public policy of the forum to recognize such marriage. Pen-
negar v. State, 87 Tenn., 244; Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash., 89. This
latter exception, however, is contrary to the weight of authority in this
country. State v. Hand, 87 Neb., 189; Harding v. Allen, 9 Me., 140. The
facts in the principal case show that the parties left the State of New York
and were married in New Jersey in evasion of the laws of New York. If
the Court had given this as the reason for its decision it might be sub-
stantiated on the grounds of public policy. But the Court here follows
the English rule which is contrary to the weight of authority in this coun-
try.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-AssuMPTION OF RISK.-
FITZWATER V. WARREN, 99 N. E., 1042 (N. Y.).-Held, that where a master
violated the law requiring all set screws to be guarded, a servant, though
working with kn6wledge of that violation, did not assume the risk of injury.
An employe does not assume risks which are caused by the violation
of a statute by the employer. Davis v. Mercer Lumber Co., 164 Ind., 413;
contra, Marshall v. Norcross, 191 Mass., 568. The decision in the above
case seems to represent the weight of authority in all cases except those
against railroads where it is consistently held that where an employe
working with knowledge that the company was violating a statute, and
without protest, was injured, he would be taken to have assumed the r',.
Where the train is exceeding the speed limit allowed by law. Martin v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 118 Iowa, 148. Where the guard rails are
not lawfully filled and blccked. Gillen v. Patten & S. R. R. Co., 93 Me.,
80. Where automatic car couplings required by statute are not used.
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Cleveland & E. R. R. Co. v. Somers, 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 67. (Since
this case was decided, Congress has passed a statute prohibiting railroads
from availing themselves of the defense where automatic couplers are not
used.) The basis of these decisions is that the statute was passed for the
protection of the public, and not especially for the employe. Sweeney v.
Central Pac. R. R. Co., 57 Cal., 15. Applying this test to the principal
case, it appears that the case was correctly decided.
REWARDs-ACCEPTANCE-KNOWLEDGE OF AccEPTOR.-SULLIVAN V. PHIL-
LIPS, 98 N. E., 868 (IND.).-Held, that where a defendant offered a reward
for the discovery and production of certain corporate books, it was not es-
sential to plaintiff's recovery of the reward that she had knowledge thereof
when she performed the service.
The offer of a reward for an act gives rise to a unilateral contract and
becomes binding when the terms of the offer are complied with. Cummings
v. Gann., 52 Pa. St., 484; Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L., 310. To entitle a
plaintiff to the reward he must allege and prove that the terms of the
offer have been complied with. Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo., 501;
Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y., 248. In an early English case it was found
that the plaintiff did not act in reliance upon the offer of reward, but was
induced by other motives. The Court held that it could not go into those
motives. Williams v. Carwardine, 4 Barn. & Ad., 621. A number of cases,
misinterpreting the doctrine of Williams v. Carwardine. held, that one may
earn the reward, although he performed the service without knowledge of
the offer. Drummond -v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. (U. S.), 356; Eagle v.
Smith, 4 Houst. (Del.), 293; Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind., 199. But
by the weight of authority the person rendering the service must have
knowledge of the offer in order to be entitled to the reward. The offer
of a reward being looked upon as an offer to make a contract which re-
quires the meeting of the minds. Williams v. West Chicago R. R. Co., 191
111., 610; Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y., 604; Stroud v. Garrison, 24 Ark.,
53. Some Courts carry this doctrine a step further, holding, that to en-
title a plaintiff to recover, his acts and services must be rendered with a
view of obtaining the reward even though he had knowledge of the offer.
Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Cal., 476; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Sebring, 16 111.
App., 181. The principal case is opposed to the weight of authority. It
is inconsistent with the conception that an offer of a reward rises out of
contract, for that would require knowledge of the offer in order to assent.
A discussion of this question will be found in 54 Cent. L. J., 184.
